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In a patient transferred from Togo to Cologne, 
Germany, Lassa fever was diagnosed 12 days post mor-
tem. Sixty-two contacts in Cologne were categorised 
according to the level of exposure, and gradual infec-
tion control measures were applied. No clinical signs 
of Lassa virus infection or Lassa specific antibodies 
were observed in the 62 contacts. Thirty-three indi-
viduals had direct contact to blood, other body fluids 
or tissue of the patients. Notably, with standard pre-
cautions, no transmission occurred between the index 
patient and healthcare workers. However, one second-
ary infection occurred in an undertaker exposed to 
the corpse in Rhineland-Palatinate, who was treated 
on the isolation unit at the University Hospital of 
Frankfurt. After German authorities raised an alert 
regarding the imported Lassa fever case, an American 
healthcare worker who had cared for the index patient 
in Togo, and who presented with diarrhoea, vomiting 
and fever, was placed in isolation and medevacked to 
the United States. The event and the transmission of 
Lassa virus infection outside of Africa underlines the 
need for early diagnosis and use of adequate personal 
protection equipment (PPE), when highly contagious 
infections cannot be excluded. It also demonstrates 
that larger outbreaks can be prevented by infection 
control measures, including standard PPE.
Introduction
Lassa fever (LF) is an acute viral disease caused by 
an enveloped RNA virus from the  Arenaviridae  family 
with a zoonotic reservoir. It is endemic in West Africa, 
particularly in the four countries of Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Nigeria [1]. Moreover, cases in 
Ghana, Mali and Benin [2] have also been reported 
[3]. Its clinical course ranges from asymptomatic infec-
tion to severe haemorrhagic disease [4]. The observed 
case-fatality rate among hospitalised patients with 
LF is 15% [5]. Nosocomial infections have also been 
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described [6]. Infections with Lassa virus (LASV) out-
side Africa are rare. Until March 2016, only 13 imported 
cases have been reported in the European Union (EU) 
and the United States (US), seven of which were fatal 
[7]. All 13 patients had been infected during stays in 
West Africa. When LF is diagnosed or suspected, ade-
quate infection control measures have to be applied to 
prevent secondary infections [8].
Here we describe the anti-epidemic measures taken 
around a case of LF imported from Togo to Cologne, 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany.
Case report
On 25 February 2016, a previously healthy nurse in his 
mid-40s who worked in a hospital in Togo, was admit-
ted to the University Hospital of Cologne (UHC), in 
Germany. Approximately two weeks earlier in Togo the 
patient had developed fever, malaise, and a sore throat. 
He had immediately started treatment for suspected 
malaria, but was admitted to a local hospital 6 days 
later with ongoing fever and abdominal tenderness. On 
22 February, the patient had undergone a diagnostic 
laparotomy in Togo, which yielded no pathologic result. 
As the patient’s condition deteriorated continuously, 
he was medevacked to UHC for further treatment. 
Upon admission to the intensive care unit, the patient 
was in septic shock, intubated and mechanically ven-
tilated. The abdominal laparotomy wound discharged 
clear serous secretions but appeared otherwise incon-
spicuous. Laboratory tests showed leucocytosis, anae-
mia, acute renal failure, and liver failure, disseminated 
intravascular coagulopathy and elevated inflammation 
parameters (Table 1).
Figure 1
Histopathological image of liver, case of Lassa fever imported from Togo to Germany, 2016
 
Fat droplet
Scale bar = 200 µm
Necrotic liver cell
Liver histology showing widespread necrosis without inflammation; individual hepatocytes with acidophilic appearance without any signs of 
cholestasis and a moderate macrovesicular steatosis with lipofuscin deposition.
H and E stain, magnification 200x.
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Since viral haemorrhagic fevers (VHF) are endemic in 
West Africa and the clinical diagnosis was inconclusive, 
blood and liver samples were sent to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Collaborating Centre for Arbovirus 
and Haemorrhagic Fever Reference and Research 
(Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine (BNITM), 
in Hamburg, Germany) for further analyses. The BNITM 
laboratory reported a positive PCR test for LASV on 9 
March 2016 (Figure 2). Other causative agents for viral 
haemorrhagic diseases such as Crimean-Congo haem-
orrhagic fever virus, Ebola virus, yellow fever virus, 
dengue virus and Rift Valley fever virus were negative. 
The results were communicated immediately to the 
UHC and to the German health authorities. The corpse 
was subsequently safely cremated, as required by the 
German law. 
Contact tracing and infection control 
measures
As soon as the diagnosis of imported LF was con-
firmed on 9 March 2016, a task force was immediately 
formed. This task force included members of UHC, 
the local and state public health authorities of North-
Rhine Westphalia, and the Permanent Working Group 
of Competence and Treatment Centers for highly con-
tagious and life-threatening diseases (STAKOB), coor-
dinated by the Robert Koch Institute (RKI), Germany’s 
federal public health institute.
Based on the literature, the estimated window for 
potential development of LF in contacts was set at 21 
days after last contact [2]. Individuals in North-Rhine 
Westphalia who had been in contact with the patient, 
his body fluids or corpse were identified and were 
defined as primary contact persons. They were inter-
viewed to establish the type of contact and to confirm 
the presence of symptoms, and instructed about codes 
of conduct and signs and symptoms to pay attention 
to. According to national recommendations, four risk 
categories were defined, with Ia bearing the highest 
and III bearing the lowest risk of infection (Table 2) [10]. 
The national recommendations are not specific for LF 
but are general recommendations for VHF [10]. Risk cat-
egories and infection control measures were discussed 
Table 1






Haematocrit (%) 42.00–50.00 29 17
Haemoglobin (g/dL) 13.5–18.0 9.2 5.5
Reticulocyte count (%) 0.3–1.8 ND 0.9
White cell count (per mm3) 4,400–11,300 34,670 31,680
Platelet count (per mm3) 150,000–400,000 190,000 115,000
Prothrombin time (%) 70–120 49 < 10
Prothrombin time international normalised ratio 2.0–4.5 1.5 ND
Activated partial-thromboplastin time (sec) < 36 70 > 120
Fibrinogen (mg/dL) 2.1–4.0 0.8 < 0.5
Sodium (mmol/L) 135–145 141 159
Potassium (mmol/L) 3.6–4.8 6.1 5.5
Chloride (mmol/L) 94–110 111 97
Calcium (mg/dL) 2.04–2.59 1.49 1.15
Phosphorus (mg/dL) 0.81–1.45 2.67 5.84
Magnesium (mg/dL) 0.7–1.1 0.93 1.27
Glucose (mg/dL) 74–109 101 338
Total protein (g/dL) 66–87 43 30
Albumin 35–52 20 19
Alanine aminotransferase (U/L) < 50 948 918
Aspartate aminotransferase (U/L) < 50 5,372 4,720
Bilirubine total (mg/dL) <1.2 1.1 0.8
Creatinine (mg/dL) 0.5−1.1 6.9 5.79
Creatinine kinase (U/L) < 190 6,383 7,371
Lactic dehydrogenase (U/L) < 250 11,164 8,239
C-reactive protein (mg/L) < 5.0 55.7 19.9
Procalcitonin (µg/L) < 0.1 4.4 1.5
Lactate < 2.2 21 > 30
ND: Not done.
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by STAKOB, UHC and the local public health authority 
for this LASV case.
According to national recommendations, contacts clas-
sified in category Ib without clinical symptoms were 
placed in home quarantine. They were instructed to 
take their temperature twice daily and they were also 
interviewed for the presence of symptoms twice daily 
by public health authorities. Based on a discussion 
by STAKOB, UHC and local public health authorities 
and following risk-benefit analysis, prophylactic treat-
ment with ribavirin was not provided as the benefit is 
not clear and adverse effects are frequently observed. 
Home quarantine was discontinued in the absence of 
clinical symptoms 21 days after the last contact with 
the infected patient.
Laboratory testing
Serum samples from contacts were collected on the 
day of the first counselling and 4 to 6 weeks later. If 
any clinical symptoms developed, PCR testing for LASV 
was performed and category Ib contacts were taken 
into strict isolation on specialised wards. Lassa testing 
was undertaken at BNITM, WHO Collaborating Centre 
for Arbovirus and Haemorrhagic Fever Reference and 
Research, Hamburg, Germany. LASV RNA was purified 
from plasma using QIAamp Viral RNA Mini Kit (Qiagen, 
Hilden, Germany) and detected using an in-house 
RT-PCR assay targeting LASV S and L RNA segments 
[11,12]. PCR fragments were sequenced to confirm the 
diagnosis. Serology for the detection of IgG or IgM anti-
bodies against three different LASV strains (AV, Josiah, 
Togo 2/2016) was performed with indirect immunofluo-
rescence assays (IIFA) using LASV-infected Vero cells 
as described previously [12,13]. Sera were tested at a 
dilution of 1:20.
Results
Contact tracing identified 62 individuals from differ-
ent services (medical, laboratory, cleaning, technical, 
transportation) in North-Rhine Westphalia who had 
contact with the patient, his body fluids, or corpse in 
Cologne. Thirty-three contacts were classified in risk 
category Ib, 17 in category II, and 12 in category III. 
Notably, all physicians and nurses caring for the patient 
directly, as well as the pathologists, used appropri-
ate personal protection equipment (PPE). Appropriate 
PPE included gloves, gowns, facemasks and goggles. 
However, no specific PPE for haemorrhagic fevers 
was used. All 33 contacts in category Ib were placed 
in home quarantine. Primary contacts (n = 55) were 
offered Lassa serology testing while primary contacts 
who developed symptoms received LASV PCR testing 
in addition to serology. Overall, seven contacts devel-
oped mostly mild clinical symptoms (low grade fever, 
respiratory symptoms, or gastrointestinal discomfort) 
during the incubation period of 21 days. In seven con-
tacts (six of whom were temporarily hospitalised on 
an isolation ward) LASV infection was ruled out by 
repeated PCR testing.
However, one secondary infection occurred in an under-
taker living in Rhineland-Palatinate, who was classified 
in category II on 11 March, 2 days after the diagnosis of 
Lassa fever had become known [9].
Importantly, post-mortem examination of the patient 
from Togo did not initially reveal an infectious cause 
of death. PCR results from a sample of the undertaker 
taken on 11 March were negative for LASV. He became 
febrile again on 15 March and immunglobuline M (IgM) 
against LASV and a second PCR were positive on 15 
March. He was immediately hospitalised on a high-
level isolation unit and had a prolonged course of LF 
[14].
For LASV serology, serum samples were collected from 
55 contacts of the index patient (Table 4). Seven con-
tacts did not provide blood for testing. Except for the 
undertaker, all other contacts remained negative for 
IgG against LASV.
International alert
On the night of 9 March 2016, BNTIM informed RKI, 
WHO Headquarters, the hospital in Togo where the 
index case had been working and the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) about the lab-
oratory confirmation of LF in the index case. On 10 
Table 2
Categorisation of contacts, case of imported Lassa fever from Togo, North Rhine Westphalia, Germany, 2016
Category Description
Category Ia
Cutaneous, percutaneous, needle stick or mucosal exposure to blood, or other body fluids or tissue of the 
index patient without appropriate personal protection equipment (PPE)
Category Ib
Exposure to blood, or other body fluids or tissue of the index patients with appropriate PPE (e.g. nursing 
and medical staff, laboratory staff, cleaning staff)
Category II
Caring, examining diagnostic specimen with appropriate PPE, exposure to clothes, linen or other objects of 
the index person
Category III Any other kind of contact with the index patient (e.g. staying in the same room)
Adapted from [10].
Infection control measures were applied depending on the respective risk category (Table 3) adapted from [10].
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March, RKI as national contact point officially reported 
details of the index case to WHO Regional Office for 
Europe, the International Health Regulations (IHR) 
National Focal Points of the US and Togo as well as the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), the latter via the Early Warning and Response 
System (EWRS) mechanism. The German secondary 
case was similarly reported on 16 March, with updates 
on contact tracing results in the following days.
Following the alert, on 12 March 2016, another sec-
ondary case working as surgeon, who had cared for 
the index patient in Togo and who had become febrile, 
was evacuated to the US where he tested positive for 
LF virus on 13 March [15] (Figure 2). He also recovered 
upon hospitalisation in a specialised treatment cen-
tre in the US [15]. WHO produced a comprehensive 
Environmental Impact Statement on LF in Togo and 
published on 23 March a disease outbreak news on the 
German cases [16] while ECDC released a Rapid Risk 
Assessment on Lassa in West Africa, Germany, and the 
US on the same day [7].
Discussion
In a patient transferred from a hospital in Togo, who 
died a few hours after arrival in UHC, the clinical 
diagnosis was refractory septic shock without identifi-
able origin. LASV infection had not been suspected ini-
tially, due to unspecific clinical symptoms and because 
Togo had not been known before as a country endemic 
for LF. Twelve days after the patient’s death, the diag-
nosis of LASV infection was established by analysis 
of post-mortem histological and serological samples. 
Liver histology showed a widespread necrosis without 
inflammation. Widespread necrosis of hepatocytes is a 
hallmark of severe acute viral liver damage, however, 
the morphological appearance in our case was highly 
unusual for viral damage by hepatitis B or C virus. The 
type of necrosis, its widespread distribution and the 
lack of inflammatory response, were highly suggestive 
of an acute viral hepatitis of the haemorrhagic fever 
subgroup.
When these findings became known, contacts with 
the patient, his body and his specimens, had occurred 
on numerous occasions in absence of specific precau-
tions required for biosafety level 4 (BSL4) pathogens, 
as was previously described for other imported cases 
of LF [17].
Individuals with increased risk exposures included the 
clinical staff who treated this critically ill patient and 
Table 3

























  Observation, temperature measurement    +   +    +   -
  General interdiction of work    +   +   -   -
  Home quarantine   NA   +   -   -
  Quarantine in hospital    + -   -   -
  Blood sampling in case of future assessments    +   +    +    +
  Virological tests (PCR etc.)    +   +    +    +
  Contacts with symptoms (e.g. fever)
  Observation, temperature measurement    +    +    +    +
  General interdiction of work    +    +    +    +
  Home quarantine   NA   NA    +    +
  High-level isolation in hospital    +    +   + / −   + / −
  Virological diagnostics (PCR etc.)    +    +    +    +
  Post-exposure prophylaxis    +    +   + / −   + / −
NA: not applicable; PPE: personal protection equipment.
 + required measure; – not required measure; + / − decision on a case-by-case basis.
Adapted from [10].
Based on the recommendations by Germany’s central institution of biomedicine and public health, the Robert Koch Institute, Berlin, four risk 
categories were adapted from [10]. Infection control measures were applied depending on the isolation category.
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the pathologists who performed the autopsy. All of 
them used standard PPE and no transmission occurred 
in this group. In this context, it is of note that there was 
limited contact as the patient died within 10 hours of 
admission. We excluded asymptomatic or mild LASV 
infection in 47 contacts, serologically. Asymptomatic 
or mild infections were identified in up to 80% of con-
tacts of infected individuals in similar situations [4]. 
Despite the severity of the event, seven contacts did 
not provide serum for testing and several contacts only 
provided serum once.
The categorisation of contacts was based on recom-
mendations for VHF in general. However, contact triage 
should be pathogen-specific as incubation periods, 
post exposure prophylaxis recommendations thera-
pies, and modes of transmission vary for different 
pathogens. These are critical considerations for deter-
mining quarantine and monitoring [18]. For the case 
described here, the recommendations were based 
on a discussion STAKOB, UHC and the local public 
health authority. While quarantine may prevent further 
transmission of highly pathogenic viruses, it may also 
Table 4
Characteristics and Lassa virus (LASV) laboratory results of primary contact persons of the index patient for whom LASV 
testing was performed, Germany 2016 (n=55)
Contact categorya Ib II III
Summary of 
primary contacts
Number 33     17            5           55
Sex (n)
Female 17 10 3 30
Male 16 7 2 25
Median age, years (IQR) 41 (31–49) 41 (28–45) 29 (28–29) 39 (29–46)
Type of contact (n)
Patient, alive 18 5 0 23
Corpse 9 1 0 10
Body fluids 4 11 1 16
Fixed patient material 2 0 0 2
No direct contactb 0 0 4 4
Profession (n)
Physician 9 2 0 11
Pathologist/coroner 3 0 0 3
Nurse 7 1 4 12
Laboratory technician/medical assistant 8 10 0 18
Undertaker 3 0 1 4
Transport personnel 2 3 0 5
Cleaning staff 1 1 0 2
Contacts that developed any symptoms (n) 7 0 0 7
Baseline sera (n) 28 14 5 47
Median days after contact collected (IQR) 14 (14–14) 14 (14–16) 14 (14–14) 14 (14–14)
Follow-up sera (n) 25 11 3 39
Median days after contact collected (IQR) 42 (40–48) 45 (42–48) 40 (40–44) 43 (40–48)
Positive anti-LASV IgM IIFA results/baseline sera testedc,d 0/8 0/7 0/2 0/17
Positive Anti-LASV IgG IIFA results/sera testedc baseline 
sera; follow-up sera
0/28; 0/25 0/14; 0/11 0/5; 0/3 0/47; 0/39
LASV RNA PCR person’s positive/no. of persons testede 0/7 0/0 ND 0/7
IIFA: indirect immunofluorescence assay; IQR: interquartile range; LASV: Lassa virus.
a The contact categories are defined in Table 2.
b No direct contact with the index patient (e.g. staying in the same room).
c IgG testing performed in baseline and follow-up serum of contact persons.
d IgM testing was only performed in baseline sera of patients from whom no follow-up serum could be collected.
e Only contact persons that developed any symptoms (respiratory, gastrointestinal, fever) were additionally tested with PCR for the detection 
of Lassa virus-RNA in serum samples.
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negatively impact the care for persons who develop 
symptoms not related to LF as the carers can feel fear 
being at risk of infection. Therefore, healthcare work-
ers have to be prepared to deal with the challenge of 
recognising and of adequately addressing other condi-
tions than LF in persons under quarantine.
One transmission of LASV was diagnosed in an under-
taker in another state who handled the body 6 days 
after the index person died [9]. Another secondary 
transmission was diagnosed in a healthcare worker 
who had previously cared for the index patient in Togo 
and who was subsequently treated in an American 
hospital. In 2003, a possible transmission of LASV to 
a physician in Germany, who was exposed to a patient 
with LF and who started ribavirin prophylaxis ca 36 
hours after exposure, was reported [19]. However, the 
physician was asymptomatic and nosocomial transmis-
sion could not be conclusively demonstrated in this 
case.
Several important lessons can be learned from the 
event described here. First, rare but highly contagious 
infections including VHF should be taken into consider-
ation in patients who present with febrile disease and 
have recently lived or travelled in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Malaria is highly prevalent in the areas endemic for 
LF. The majority of LF cases are reported in the coun-
tries of the Mano river basin (Guinea, Sierra Leone and 
Liberia) and Nigeria [1]. Recent Lassa outbreaks have 
been reported in Burkina Faso (March 2017), Benin 
(June 2016), Nigeria (May 2016) and Liberia (May 2016) 
[20]. Lassa epidemics continually challenge health 
systems in countries with limited resources and have 
the potential of creating large epidemics. To develop 
prevention strategies and improve laboratory diagnos-
tics for LF and other dangerous diseases, an interna-
tional working group, including health ministries from 
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and other partners, 
has been set up under the umbrella of WHO [20].
Since co-infections are common, a diagnosis or sus-
picion of malaria should only rule out the suspicion 
of LF or another VHF, if patients returning from areas 
where VHFs could potentially occur, have responded 
sufficiently to malaria specific treatment. Even if VHFs 
have not been reported before in the specific area, 
they should be considered and prompt specific infec-
tion prevention measures [21]. With the increase of 
international travel activities, physicians worldwide 
will be confronted more frequently with similar situ-
ations in the future. Importantly, outbreaks of VHF or 
other highly infectious diseases in Africa may some-
times only be recognised by diagnosis of cases outside 
endemic areas.
Second, the use of PPE including gloves, gowns, masks 
and goggles is effective in prevention of transmission 
of highly infectious viruses [22]. Whether or not high-
level isolation units are required for the treatment of LF 
is a matter of international debate [23]. Of note, a case 
of secondary transmission of Ebola virus in Spain in 
2014 represented a challenge for both health services 
and public health authorities. This incident highlighted 
the need for constant updating and training of profes-
sionals in the use of PPE to ensure adequate infection 
control and protection of individuals [24].
Third, information on highly infectious diseases and 
education in suitable infection prevention measures 
should not be limited to healthcare workers, but should 
also include other professionals such as undertakers 
or cleaning staff who could potentially be affected.
Fourth, to effectively limit transmission of LF or other 
highly contagious infections, comprehensive hygiene 
and emergency plans should be in place. In our case, 
the existence of a national working group dedicated 
to the clinical management of these cases (STAKOB) 
was extremely valuable. There was significant uncer-
tainty on how to deal with specific risk contacts, which 
needed concerted decisions by the state and local pub-
lic health authorities.
In conclusion, all exposed healthcare workers (n = 27) 
in category Ib in Cologne were negative for LASV and 
one transmission occurred in an undertaker exposed to 
the corpse in Rhineland-Palatinate. Early diagnosis and 
management of haemorrhagic fevers and other uncom-
mon communicable diseases require a high level of 
awareness. Standard infection prevention measures 
such as wearing gloves, gowns, masks and goggles 
should be consistently applied when caring for febrile 
patients with undetermined diagnosis after returning 
from tropical areas [25].
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